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POST OPERATIVE TRANSSEXUALS’ RIGHT TO M ARRIAGE
By Sarah Leinicke*

C

an people born female and who identify as men, whose
birth certificates and drivers licenses state they are men,
and have masculine names, beards, chests, who wear
men’s clothing, and go by the pronoun “he” marry women?
Similarly, can people born male and who identify as women,
whose birth certificates and drivers licenses state they are
women, and have feminine names, breasts, vaginas, who wear
women’s clothing, and go by the pronoun “she” marry men?
As medical and societal understandings of gender change,
courts are grappling with who defines a person’s gender for legal
matters such as marriage. The medical community no longer
considers gender a clear, simple factor determined by sex at
birth. For example, the Merriam Webster Medical Dictionary,
reflecting a more complicated and nuanced concept of gender,
now defines it as a combination of behavioral, cultural and psychological traits.1 In response to this change, some courts have
found that a person’s gender was a medical factor for doctors to
define.2 Other courts have considered gender a matter of social
policy that the legislative branch should define.3 None, thus far,
have determined that one’s gender is for the individual alone to
determine. This article will examine how the definition of gender
impacts a transsexual person’s the right to marriage.

DEFINITIONS: THE TRANSGENDER UMBRELLA
“Transgender” is an umbrella term for people whose gender
identity does not conform to traditional notions of their biological sex. Examples of transgender people include cross-dressers,
drag queens, and transsexuals.
Transgender people who want to change their physical sex
characteristics, through hormone treatment and/or sex reassignment surgery, are transsexuals. If they have already undergone
hormone treatment or surgery, they are called “post-operative
transsexuals,” as opposed to “pre-operative transsexuals.” Today,
transgender people endure discrimination in employment, housing, health care, social services, and face disproportionate police
harassment.4 As a result of such rampant inequity, transgender
people are disproportionately poor, homeless, and incarcerated,
and are 7-10 times more likely to be a victim of murder.5

SEXUAL REASSIGNMENT HORMONE TREATMENT AND
SURGERY
Psychiatrists repeated attempts to treat transsexuals without
hormones or surgery have been ineffective in combating the
population’s high incidence of self-mutilation or suicide.6 In contrast, sex reassignment treatment significantly reduces suicide
rates among transsexuals and improves their mental stability,
socioeconomic functioning and partnership experience.7
In order to undergo sex reassignment treatment, potential
patients must prove they meet the requirements of Gender Iden18

tity Disorder as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Illness (DSM – IV).8 The DSM – IV has a long list of
criteria for transsexuals, such as “persistent discomfort” in the
gender role that causes “clinically significant distress or impairment” in their work or personal lives.9
However, despite satisfying these strict requirements, many
people still do not have access to sex reassignment treatment due
to the high cost of the procedure and few alternative sources to
provide funding. Medical treatment for Gender Identity Disorder
can cost thousands of dollars and is rarely covered by insurance
plans. Medicare does not cover sex reassignment surgery and
Medicaid very rarely extends coverage for the treatment.10 Furthermore, all private insurance plans in the U.S. explicitly exclude coverage for sex reassignment treatments.11
Low-income transsexuals who cannot afford hormones or
surgery are more visibly gender non-conforming and thus prone
to employment and other discrimination. Also, people cannot
change the gender on their driver’s licenses or birth certificates if
they have not undergone sex reassignment treatment.12 Absent
proper identification documents, low-income, pre-operative
transsexuals do not have the advantages of their wealthier, postoperative counterparts in trying to access legal marriage. For that
reason, this article only addresses the right to marriage for postoperative transsexuals.

THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL MARRIAGE BENEFITS
Post-operative transsexuals have joined queers and their
allies in the fight to access federal and state benefits for married
couples that are not offered in civil unions, including benefits in
health insurance, taxes, unemployment compensation, immigration status, family leave, inheritance, and hospital visitation.13
The marriage equality movement suffered a significant setback
in the November 2004 elections, when many states adopted constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage. Due to recent case holdings, state governments now have the responsibility to determine whether the marriage of post-operative transsexual to persons of their birth-sex falls into the category of
same-sex marriage.

KANTARAS V. KANTARAS: A LANDMARK CASE
The holdings of the trial and appellate courts in Kantaras v.
Kantaras each reflect two different perspectives on a postoperative transsexual’s right to marry.14 The Circuit Court for
Pasco County ruled that a post-operative female-to-male transsexual’s marriage to a non-transgender woman was legal.15 The
Florida Second District Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s decision, ruling that the legislature should determine
whether medical advancements support a change in the meaning
of the words “female” and “male.”16
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In 1959, Margo Kantaras was born female in Ohio.17 In
1986, after coming to terms with her gender identity, Margo
legally changed his name to Michael in Texas.18 In 1987, Michael was approved by the Gender Treatment Program at the
Rosenberg Clinic in Texas for sex reassignment surgery.19 He
underwent hormonal treatment, a hysterectomy, and a double
mastectomy.20 In 1988, he met Linda, who was pregnant by a
former boyfriend.21 Linda knew that Michael was a transsexual.22 In 1989, Michael married Linda in Florida and adopted her
son.23 In 1992, Linda gave birth to a daughter after undergoing
artificial insemination with the sperm of Michael’s biological
brother.24 Michael and Linda raised their two children together
for nine years.25 In 1998, Michael filed for divorce and custody
of both children.26 Linda counterpetitioned for dissolution and/or
annulment claiming that the marriage was void because it violated the Florida law banning same-sex marriage.27 One year
later, the Probate Court of Mahoning County, Ohio granted Michael’s request to change his birth certificate to read “Michael
Kantaras” with the sex marked as “male.”28

TRIAL COURT: MARRIAGE IS VALID
In a landmark 809-page opinion aired nationally on Court
TV, the Circuit Court for Pasco County found that Michael Kantaras was legally male when he married Linda and that their
marriage was valid.29 The court also gave Michael primary residential custody of their two children.30 It was the first known
case in the United States that included testimony from medical
experts concerning transsexual marriage.31 Previous transsexual
marriage cases in Kansas and Texas were pre-trial defense motions that did not include such medical testimony.32 This is an
example of a court’s deference to medical expert testimony with
regards to defining gender.
The trial court’s reasons for determining that Kantaras was
legally male included: 1) his parents and siblings observed male
characteristics and agreed he should have been born as a boy; 2)
Michael always perceived himself as a boy while he was growing up; 3) he completed the medical surgeries and hormone
treatments to gain a male body and voice; 4) Linda was fully
informed about Michael’s sex reassignment status when they
married; 5) Michael had been accepted as a man in “a variety of
social and legal ways,” including on his driver’s license, birth
certificate, and in legal adoption proceedings; 6) Michael was
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder at age 20; 7) Michael
had no secondary female characteristics, such as ovaries, fallopian tubes, or breasts; 8) the only female feature remaining on
Michael’s body, the vagina, was not typically female because of
an enlarged and elongated clitoris; 9) no chromosome tests were
conducted to determine that Michael had a female chromosomal
pattern (XX); and 10) chromosomes were only one factor in
determining sex and did not overrule gender or self identity.33
The trial court’s reasons for concluding Micheal Kantaras
gender as legally male, as outlined above, focused on scientific
advancements in gender determination that strayed from tradi-
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tional notions of biologically determined gender. The court
treated Kantaras’ gender as a matter of fact rather than a matter
of law.34 In contrast, the Texas Court of Appeals and the Kansas
Supreme Court had both found that post-operative transsexual
marriage cases presented matters of law.35
In the closing arguments of the trial court case, counsel for
Linda Kantaras, Claudia Wheeler, cautioned against the disastrous consequences if the court deemed Micheal to be legally
male. "If you open the door this much it's going to be like the
barnyard door coming open. If Michael can be a male because
Michael thinks he is a male, and because of some surgery, your
Honor, then we're headed for big trouble… It will create utter
chaos. I believe the floodgates will be opened.”36 Apparently,
the appellate court agreed.

APPELLATE COURT: MARRIAGE RULED INVALID
The Florida Second District Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court decision, ruling that a post-operative female-to-male
transsexual could not validly marry a female in Florida.37 The
court ruled that the guidelines for transsexual marriage was an
issue for the legislature to decide.38 “We must adhere to the
common meaning of the statutory terms and invalidate any marriage that is not between persons of the opposite sex determined
by their biological sex at birth.”39 In its decision the court noted
the Probate Court of Ohio, the Kansas Supreme Court, and the
Texas Court of Appeals decisions all delegated the issue of
transsexual marriage to the legislature.40
The Florida Second District Court of Appeals relied on the
public policy view that the purpose of marriage was to procreate
as the basis for their decision.41 The court noted that the New
York Appeals Division voided a post-operative transsexual marriage because the marriage could not produce genetic offspring,42 and that marriage “exists for the purpose of begetting
offspring.”43 Thus, the court associated gender with sexual function. Since sex reassignment surgery does not enable people to
fully perform sexual functions, the New York court argued that
post-operative transsexuals could not fulfill this purpose of marriage.44 Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court relied on sexual
function in defining gender. The court used a 1970s definition of
sex contained in Webster’s dictionary that males are the “sex
that fertilize the ovum and beget offspring” and females
“produce ova and bear offspring.”45 As a point of contrast, the
Florida court also examined one United States case where a
transsexual marriage was ruled valid. The New Jersey court held
that a transsexual could marry in his or her reassigned sex if the
person could “fully function sexually.”46 However, in the New
Jersey case, sexual function referred to the act of having sex
rather than to “begetting offspring.”
Ruling that sexual function and the ability to procreate are
requisites for marriage raises complications for other infertile
couples, such as sterile men or post-menopausal women.47 Such
complications underscore the inadequacy of the Florida court’s
decision in an age where gender and sex no longer align with
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traditional roles in procreation.

AUSTRALIAN AND EUROPEAN COURT POSITIONS
Michael Kantaras drew on Australian precedent to defend
his case.48 Australia also prohibits same-sex marriage but found
that a post-operative female-to-male transsexual could legally
marry a woman.49 In contrast to most U.S. courts, the Australian
Family Court recognized advancements in medical knowledge
surrounding gender identity and found that a female-to-male
transsexual was a man for purposes of marriage.50
The European Court also allows post-operative transsexuals
to marry.51 In 2002, the European Court held that the United
Kingdom violated a male-to-female transsexual’s right to marriage under the European Convention on Human Rights.52 The
European court contrasted the stress and humiliation caused by
the disjuncture between the transsexual person’s legal and personal lives with the impact that changing the law would have on
United Kingdom authorities.53 The court concluded that “[S]
ociety may reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience to enable individuals to live in dignity and worth in
accordance with the sexual identity chosen by them at great personal cost.”54 The European Court held that member countries
could not bar transsexuals from marrying; however, each country could determine the specific requirements applicants must
meet in order to be eligible for legal sex reassignment.55
In contrast to the Australian Family Court and the European
Court, U.S. federal courts, like the Florida Second District Court
of Appeals, do not recognize the right of post-operative transsexuals to marry.56 A Filipino man filed suit against the Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) for denying him citizen-

ship based on his marriage because his American wife was
transsexual.57 The woman had undergone male-to-female sex
reassignment nearly 20 years prior.58 The Filipino man married
the woman a year after legally entering the U.S. and applied for
permanent resident status.59 This case is likely the first suit to
challenge the CIS in federal court over the immigration status of
married transsexuals.60 The U.S. federal government currently
has no statute or regulation that addresses whether people can
legally change their sex.61

CONCLUSION
At a time when scientific understandings of gender have
outgrown traditional definitions, the societal benefits of denying
transsexual marriage are vague. In contrast, the benefits of marriage to transsexual people are clear. They would not only gain
the traditional legal advantages of marriage, but formal and legal
recognition of their lives as reflected on their birth certificates
and drivers licenses – the lives they lead in their homes and in
their jobs. The Florida District Court of Appeals called on the
state legislature to amend marriage law if it wanted the courts to
include post-operative transsexuals in marriage.62 The decision
of the Florida state legislatures and other state legislatures will
bear great implication for transsexuals and their partners. As
Michael Kantaras’ attorney Karen Doering said during the closing arguments of the trial court case: "[Michael’s] family knows
[that he is a man], the community knows it, and the medical
community knows it. And now, your honor, you've been asked
to decide whether the legal community knows that Michael Kantaras is a man."63
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